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1. Approaches to Existence
In	analytic	philosophy	the	concept	of	existence	has	been	approached	
by	 investigating	 the	 logical	 grammar	 of	 ‘exists’	 and	 its	 synonyms.	
Grammatically,	‘exists’	seems	to	be	a	first-order	predicate	that	is	true	of	
objects.	It	occurs	in	predicate	position	in	subject-predicate	sentences	
such	as	‘Pluto	(the	planet)	exists’	and	in	quantified	sentences	such	as	
‘No	tame	tigers	exist.’1
Frege	and,	 following	him,	Russell	 argued	 that	 these	grammatical	
appearances	 are	misleading.	 If	 ‘exists’	 (‘is’)	 is	 a	 universal	 first-order	
predicate,	 nothing	we	 can	 assert	 it	 of	 can	 lack	 it.	Hence,	 sentences	
such	as	‘Pluto	exists	(is)’	are	obviously	true.	So	why	should	language,	
asked	Frege,	“invent	a	word	for	a	property	which	could	not	be	of	the	
slightest	use	for	[determining	an	object]	further?”	(Frege	1884a,	40).2 
This	puzzle	is	resolved	if	we	take	‘exists’	to	be	a	misleading	expression:	
it	looks	like	a	first-order	predicate,	but	expresses	a	second-order	concept	
that	subsumes	first-order	concepts.	In	asserting	a	sentence	such	as	‘A	
moon	of	Jupiter	exists’,	one	denies	that	0	is	the	number	of	the	concept	
[moon	 of	 Jupiter].3 So	 construed,	 existence	 statements	 are	 not	 obvi-
ously	true:	it	is	a	non-trivial	question	whether	a	concept	is	satisfied	or	
not.	(I	will	return	to	this	argument	in	section	7.)
Russell	 articulated	 the	 same	 idea	 in	 terms	 of	 propositional	 func-
tions.4	To	say	that	a	moon	of	Jupiter	exists	is	to	say	that	the	proposi-
tional	function	x is a moon of Jupiter has	a	value	that	makes	it	true.	If	we	
want	to	make	existence	claims	in	a	non-misleading	way,	we	need	to	
1.	 On	subject-predicate	sentences,	see	McNally	2011,	1830.	She	goes	on	to	re-
serve	 the	 term	 ‘existence	 sentences’	 for	 sentences	 that	 don’t	 have	 subject-
predicate	structure.	See	Moore	1936,	177f.	On	quantifier	sentences,	see,	 for	
example,	Evans	1982,	346–7.
2.	 I	 have	 changed	 the	 translation;	 page	 numbers	 of	 the	 German	 text	 are	 in	
square	brackets.	See	also	Frege	1884b,	63–4	[70–1]	and	Berto	2013,	13.	Frege	
1884b,	 63–4	 [71]	 outlines	 an	 account	 of	 how	and	why	 such	 a	 “contentless”	
word	could	be	introduced	into	natural	language.
3.	 Frege	1884a,	65.
4.	 See	Russell	1918,	242.	Kant	is	sometimes	taken	to	be	a	precursor	of	the	Frege–
Russell	view;	see	Wiggins	1995.	See	Rosenkoetter	2009	for	a	critique;	he	ar-
gues	that	Kant	and	Brentano	pursue	a	similar	approach.
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there	to	be	objects	that	don’t	exist.	Hence,	just	as	asserting	‘round’	of	
x	distinguishes	x	from	non-round	things,	asserting	‘exists’	of	x	distin-
guishes	it	from	non-existents.9	Others	hold	that	everything	exists	and	
that	 talk	of	non-existence	 is,	 strictly	speaking,	meaningless.10	 In	 this	
paper	I	will	not	try	to	adjudicate	between	these	two	parties,	but	rather	
illuminate	what	they	have	in	common:	the	view	that	‘exists’	is	a	first-
order	and	not	a	second-order	predicate.
To	start,	let	us	consider	two	good	reasons	for	rejecting	the	revised	
Frege–Russell	view:
First, quantifier	expressions	range	over	domains	of	objects.	It	is	a	
characteristic	feature	of	quantifiers	that	their	domain	can	be	restricted. 
When	I	say	“I	have	put	everything	in	the	suitcase”,	 ‘everything’	does	
not	range	unrestrictedly	over	everything — the	moon	is	not	in	the	suit-
case,	etc. — but	only	about	a	restricted	domain.	It	is	easy	to	find	similar	
cases	for	other	quantifiers.	However,	as	Walton	(2003,	240f)	has	point-
ed	out,	sentences	with	the	existence	predicate	have	no	restricted	read-
ings.	When	 I	exclaim,	after	 searching	 through	 the	cupboard,	 “There	
are	no	beans”,	the	quantifier	ranges	only	over	a	restricted	domain.	The	
truth	of	my	utterance	 is	perfectly	 compatible	with	an	abundance	of	
beans	somewhere.	Yet,	when	I	utter,	with	assertoric	force,	‘Beans	don’t	
exist’	in	the	same	circumstances,	I	state	that	the	universe	is	bean-free.	
My	utterance	cannot	be	true	if	there	are	any	beans,	whether	in	Italy	or	
anywhere	else.	A	straightforward	explanation	for	this	observation	is	
that	‘exists’	does	not	range	over	a	domain	that	could	be	restricted.
Second,	the	modified	Frege–Russell	view	gives	embedded	or	tensed	
existence	 statements	 a	 counterintuitive	 sense.	 An	 embedded	 exis-
tence	statement	might	be:
John	believes	that	Pluto	exists.
9.	 Berto	2013,	Chapter	4;	Crane	2013,	set.	2.3.
10.	 See	Evans	1982,	369ff.	While	 ‘Vulcan	does	not	exist’	contains	the	first-level	
existence	predicate,	it	cannot	be	understood;	but	it	can	be	quasi-understood:	
we	can	pretend	that	it	has	truth-conditions.
use	sentences	of	the	form	‘There	is	(are)	…’	regimented	in	first-order	
logic	by	the	use	of	the	existential	quantifier	‘($x)	(Fx)’.	
The	Frege–Russell	view	requires	that	all	existence	statements	have	
words	referring	to	concepts	as	their	grammatical	subjects	or	that	they	
can	be	 translated	 into	 ‘There	 is	…’	sentences.	But	 in	existence	state-
ments	such	as	‘Pluto	exists’,	the	grammatical	predicate	‘exist(s)’	is	com-
pleted	by	a	singular	term	referring	to	a	planet	to	an	atomic	sentence,	
and	not	by	a	concept	designator.	Yet	we	have	the	strong	intuition	that	
such	 sentences	 are	 truth-evaluable	 and	 some	 are	 in	 fact	 true.	How-
ever,	their	translations	into	the	quantifier	idiom — for	example,	‘There	
is	Pluto’ — don’t	 sound	 like	proper	English	sentences.	 If	 ‘There	 is	…’	
expresses	a	concept	 that	subsumes	concepts	and	not	objects,	 this	 is	
to	be	 expected.	 Frege	himself	 took	 such	 sentences	 to	be	 senseless.5 
Hence,	the	Frege–Russell	view	turns	true	existential	statements	into	
false	ones	or,	even	worse,	senseless	ones.
The	standard	answer	on	behalf	of	the	Frege–Russell	view	is	to	de-
fine	a	first-order	predicate	‘exists’	in	terms	of	the	existential	quantifier	
and	identity:6 
(∀x) (x exists = df. ($y) (y = x))
If	one	utters	‘Pluto	exists’	with	assertoric	force,	one	asserts	that	there	is	
something	that	has	the	property	of	being identical with Pluto.7 
This	 revised	 Frege–Russell	 view	of	 existence	has	 been	highly	 in-
fluential.	 However,	 there	 are	 a	 growing	 number	 of	 dissenters	 who	
take	‘exists’	to	be	a	first-order	predicate.8 Some	of	the	dissenters	take	
5.	 See	Frege	1892b,	175;	original	pagination	200.
6.	 See	Berto	2013,	sect.	3.1;	Mackie	1976,	253;	Salmon	1987,	64;	Wiggins	1995	and	
2003,	486–7.
7.	 If	one	wants	to	make	room	for	plural	existence	statements,	one	needs	to	de-
fine	a	similar	predicate:	(∀X)	(X	exist	=	df.	($Y)	(Y	=	X)).	
8.	 The	 dissenters	 include	 (in	 chronological	 order)	Moore	 1936;	Mackie	 1976;	
Anscombe	1987/8,	8–12;	Vallicella	2002,	Chapter	IV;	Fine	2009;	Kripke	2013,	
34–6.	Miller	1986,	249ff,	argues	that	‘exists’	is	sometimes	a	first-order,	some-
times	a	second-order	predicate.	I	will	not	take	a	stand	on	this	ambiguity	thesis.	
For	my	purposes	it	is	sufficient	that	there	is	a	first-order	use	of	‘exists’.
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is	neither	 in	harmony	with	 the	 grammar	of	 ‘exists’	 nor	 in	 line	with	
our	ordinary	conception	of	existence.	Walton’s	observation	gives	us	
a	positive	 reason	 to	 take	grammatical	appearances	 seriously.	Saying	
“Beans	don’t	exist”	has	no	restricted	reading,	because	‘exists’	is	true	of	
everything.	
If	 ‘exists’	 is	 a	first-order	predicate,	what	 is	 its	 sense,	 the	 concept	
expressed?	Evans	articulates	the	problem	connected	to	this	question	
nicely:
Philosophical	perplexity	arises	when	an	attempt	is	made	
to	 think	of	such	a	concept-expression	as	being	 just	 like	
other	 concept-expressions.	 We	 might	 then	 think	 we	
know	its	Meaning	(a	function	which	maps	every	object	on	
to	the	True),	but	have	no	notion	what	its	sense	is.	(Evans	
1982,	348)
If	‘exists’	is	a	first-order	universal	predicate,	its	semantic	value	(refer-
ent) — Evans	 talks	of	 “Meaning” — will	be	a	 function	 that	maps	every	
object	on	to	the	True.	But	what	is	the	sense	of	this	predicate,	the	con-
cept	expressed?	 In	general,	 the	 sense	of	a	first-order	predicate	 ‘F’	 is	
given	by	a	true	statement	of	the	form:
(∀x) (‘F’ is true of x if, and only if, x …)
such	that	this	statement	is	known	by	a	speaker	who	masters	‘F’.	How-
ever,	in	the	case	of	‘exists’,	there	are	no	such	statements,	because	there	
is	no	general	and	independently	intelligible	condition	that	an	object	
satisfies	if,	and	only	if,	 it	exists.	 In	order	to	make	this	plausible,	con-
sider	a	weak	condition	like	nameability.	To	exist	is	not	to	be	nameable,	
because	there	can	be	objects	that	are	so	ephemeral	that	we	can’t	be-
stow	names	on	them.	And	so	on	for	other	conditions.	
So	while	 the	second-order	view	defines	 the	concept	of	existence,	
the	first-order	view	seems	to	be	forced	to	take	this	concept	to	be	primi-
tive.	 For	 example,	 Fine	 2009	has	 given	new	arguments	 for	 the	 con-
clusion	that	we	need	a	first-order	predicate	to	articulate	our	ontologi-
cal	commitments	(Fine	uses	‘real’	instead	of	‘exists’	to	distinguish	the	
But does John really believe that there is something that is identical with 
Pluto when he believes that Pluto exists?11 
With	 regard	 to	 tensed	 existence	 statements,	 proponents	 of	 the	
revised	second-order	view	need	to	find	a	place	 for	 tense	 in	 their	ac-
count.12	In	the	final	analysis,	a	statement	like	‘Napoleon	exists’	is	sup-
posed	to	say	that	the	number	of	the	concept	identical with Napoleon is 
not	0.	But	today	we	can	truly	say,	“Napoleon	existed,	but	he	no	longer	
exists.”	Prima facie,	this	requires	us	to	see	the	concept	identical with Na-
poleon as	having	different numbers	at	different	times.	But	the	concept	
identical with Napoleon does	not	subsume	different	things	at	different	
times,	or	one	thing	at	one	time	and	none	at	another	time.	Adding	a	
temporal	 adverb	 to	 ‘identical	with	Napoleon’	 does	 not	make	 sense:	
something	 is	not	 identical	with	Napoleon	 in March, for one week,	 etc.	
So	the	second-order	view	makes	tensed	existence	statements	difficult	
to	understand.	In	contrast,	‘exists’	can	be	combined	with	temporal	ad-
verbs — ‘exists	today’,	‘exists	on	the	on	the	15th	of	June,	1999’ — and	the	
extension	of	‘exists’,	like	that	of	many	other	first-order	predicates,	can	
vary	with	time.13
These	 objections	 suggest	 that	 the	 revised	 Frege–Russell	 view	
11.	 See	Mackie	 1976,	253.	Williams	 tried	 to	finesse	 these	problems	by	arguing	
that	sentences	such	as	 ‘John	believes	that	Pluto	exists’	are	true	if,	and	only	
if,	there	is	a	concept	under	which	only	Pluto	falls	and	John	believes	that	it	is	
instantiated.	(See	his	1981,	Chapter	4,	and	1987,	131f.)	However,	it	is	contro-
versial	that	‘John	believes	that	Pluto	exists’	says	that	there	is	a	concept	under	
which	only	Pluto	falls,	which	John	believes	is	instantiated.	See	Flint	1984,	134.	
He	[who?	Flint?]	also	gives	counter-examples	to	the	proposed	analysis.
12.	 See	Mackie	1976,	254;	Miller	1986,	246;	Anscombe	1987/8,	8–9.
13.	 See	Evans	1982,	346.	Does	the	first-order	view	of	‘exists’,	combined	with	the	
observation	 that	 the	 predicate’s	 extension	 varies	 over	 time,	 settle	 us	 with	
non-existing	objects?	Miller	(1986,	249	and	256)	showed	that	this	question	
can	 be	 answered	 negatively.	 While	 ‘exists’	 signifies	 a	 first-order	 concept,	
there	is	no	predicate	‘does	not	exist’	that	is	‘on	all	fours’	with	it	and	signifies	
a	negative	property.	The	sentence	‘Socrates	does	not	exist	(anymore)’	should	
be	regimented	as	‘It	is	not	the	case	anymore	that	(Socrates	exists)’,	such	that,	
in	the	regimented	form,	the	negation-operator	applies	to	the	whole	sentence.	
If	we	use	a	negative	free	logic,	the	atomic	sentence	‘Socrates	exists’	is	false	if	
the	name	is	empty	and	the	whole	sentence	is	true.	No	non-existing	Socrates	
is	required	by	its	truth.	
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can	have	reason	to	think	that	A	might	not	have	existed.	I	can	have	no	
reason	to	think	that	A	might	not	have	been	identical	with	itself.	
This	leaves	the	proponent	of	the	first-order	view	with	the	task	of	
removing	“philosophical	perplexity”	about	the	concept	expressed	by	
‘exists’.	 Its	sense	cannot	be	articulated	 in	 terms	of	necessary	and	suf-
ficient	conditions.	Yet	it	is	desirable	to	articulate	it	in	some	way	in	or-
der	distinguish	the	sense	of	‘exists’	from	the	sense	of	other	universal	
first-order	predicates.	I	will	tackle	this	task	in	this	paper	by	drawing	on	
Franz	Brentano’s	work.16	Brentano	aims	to	shed	light	on	the	concept	
of	existence	by	appealing	 to	a	non-propositional	attitude	and	when	
it	is	right	to	have	it.	In	this	paper	I	will	defend	the	core	of	Brentano’s	
approach	to	existence,	but	criticise	his	implementation	of	it.	The	pro-
posed	Neo-Brentanian	view	agrees	with	Brentano	that	the	attitude	of	
acknowledgement	grounds	our	mastery	of	the	sense	expressed	by	‘ex-
ists’.	It	disagrees	with	Brentano	in	that	it	does	not	give	an	analytic	defi-
nition	of	existence	in	terms	of	correct	acknowledgement.
The	basic	idea	of	Brentano’s	view	becomes	clear	if	we	compare	it	
with	the	rejectivist	view	of	negation.	Rejectivists	about	negation	take	
denying	that	p	to	be	a	sui generis	propositional	attitude	“on	all	 fours”	
(Smiley)	 with	 judgement.	When	 one	 answers	 “No”	 to	 the	 question	
whether	p,	one	denies	that p,	but	one	does	not	judge	that p is not the 
case.17	Denying	that p	is	a	matter	of	thinking	that p	in	a	particular	mode,	
not	of	applying	a	concept	to	the	content	that p.	Since	denial	does	not	
already	involve	the	concept	of	negation,	it	can	be	used	to	shed	light	on	
16.	 Schlick	1925,	39–41,	and	Stumpf	1939,	81–2,	are	early	critical	discussions	of	
Brentano’s	theory	of	existential	judgement.	However,	Schlick	seems	to	throw	
out	the	baby	with	the	bathwater:	while	Brentano’s	theory	may	not	be	a	gen-
eral	theory	of	judgement,	it	may	nonetheless	be	a	promising	theory	of	a	par-
ticular	kind	of	judgement.	Schlick’s	criticism,	it	seems	to	me,	has	informed	the	
reception	and	rejection	of	Brentano’s	ideas	in	analytic	philosophy.	The	ana-
lytic	literature	on	Brentano	on	existence	is	therefore	sparse.	An	exception	is	
Prior	1976,	111ff.	Vallicella	2001	focuses	on	Brentano’s	treatment	of	existence,	
and	Kriegel	2015	on	the	attitude	of	acknowledgement.	Brandl	2002,	section	5,	
gives	a	helpful	overview	of	Brentano’s	view	of	judgement	and	its	connection	
with	existence.	I	will	discuss	Vallicella	and	Kriegel’s	contributions	briefly	in	
section	4.	
17.	 See	Smiley	1996,	1ff.	See	also	Restall	2005,	190.
predicate	 from	 the	 quantifier).14 He	 also	 sees	 no	way	 to	 define	 this	
concept:
I	myself	do	not	see	any	way	to	define	the	concept	of	real-
ity	in	essentially	different	terms	[…].	(Fine	2009,	175)
An	analytic	definition	in	terms	of	marks	will	not	be	possible.	For	on	
the	assumption	that	existence	is	a	universal	concept,	there	is	no	more	
general	concept	such	that	adding	a	mark	to	it	will	yield	the	concept	
of	existence.	On	the	assumption	that	there	are	things	that	don’t	exist,	
it	is	unclear	what	the	general	concept	should	be	from	which	one	can	
derive	existence.	
Evans	took	this	problem	to	show	that	one	ought	to	think	of	‘exists’	
differently	 from	 other	 universal	 first-order	 predicates.	 According	 to	
him,	the	sense	of	the	universal	first-order	predicate	‘exists’	is	‘shown’	
by	the	following	satisfaction	clause	of	an	interpretative	theory	of	truth:
(x) (x satisfies ‘exists’) (Evans 1982, 348)
The	sense	of	‘exists’	is	given	by	saying	that	it	is	true	of	everything,	not	
that	it	is	true	of	things	that	satisfy	a	condition	that	some	things	satisfy	
and	others	do	not.15	This	is	progress.	However,	the	satisfaction	clauses	
for	‘existence’	and	‘self-identity’	are	the	same:
(x) (x satisfies ‘is self-identical’)
Only	if	we	illegitimately	assume	that	the	sense	of	 ‘self-identical’	has	
been	independently	fixed	can	we	hold	on	to	the	view	that	the	sense	
of	‘self-identical’	and	‘exists’	are	different.	According	to	the	satisfaction	
clause,	 ‘exists’	and	 ‘is	self-identical’	have	the	same	sense.	Hence,	Ev-
ans	can’t	distinguish	between	the	sense	of	‘exists’	and	‘is	self-identical’.	
This	 is	a	 serious	drawback.	For	 intuitively	 the	senses	are	different.	 I	
14.	 See	also	Mackie	1976,	258.
15.	 When	one	asserts	that	everything	satisfies	‘exists’,	one	does	not	need	to	spec-
ify	 further	 that	one	quantifies	only	over	everything	 that exists.	The	domain	
of	quantification	is	determined	by	the	linguistic	meaning	of	the	words	used,	
the	principle	of	charity,	and	the	context	of	utterance.	See	Rayo	2003.	Hence,	
Evans’s	account	is	not	circular.
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a	 look	at	how	Brentano	 introduces	acknowledgement.	According	 to	
him,	awareness	is	knowledge	of	our	current	perceiving,	etc.	In	what	
kind	of	knowledge	does	awareness	consist?	He	argues	that	awareness	
of	present	perceiving	is	knowledge,	but	not	knowledge	that something 
is a certain way:
No	one	who	pays	attention	to	what	goes	on	within	him-
self	when	he	hears	or	sees	and	perceives	his	act	of	hear-
ing	or	seeing	could	be	mistaken	about	the	fact	that	this	
judgement	 of	 inner	 perception	 does	 not	 consist	 in	 the	
connection	of	a	mental	act	as	subject	with	existence	as	a	
predicate,	but	consists rather in the simple acknowledgement 
[Anerkennung] of the mental phenomenon that is present in in-
ner consciousness.	(Brentano	1995a,	110/1924	I,	201;	in	part	
my	translation,	my	emphasis)21
Brentano’s	negative	point	is	that	awareness	of	perceiving	is	a	form	of	
mental	commitment	 to	ongoing	perceiving,	but	 this	mental	commit-
ment	cannot	consist	in	endorsing	a	proposition	or	making	a	predica-
tion.	An	infant	is	not	able	to	judge	that his current experiences are such-
and-such.	 The	negative	point	 suggests	 a	positive	point:	 there	 is	 one	
form	of	awareness	of	one’s	mental	activities,	which	is	non-proposition-
al	and	does	not	involve	predication.22	No	property	is	predicated,	yet	if	
we	are	aware	of	these	activities,	we	acknowledge	them.	
judgement.	The	reader	is	encouraged	to	heed	the	advice	of	Brentano’s	student	
Stumpf:	“[O]ne	must	always	bear	in	mind	that	he	used	the	term	‘judgement’	
in	a	much	more	general	way	than	do	most	people	in	ordinary	usage”	(Stumpf	
1919,	36;	my	translation).
21.	 The	English	translation	has	‘simple	affirmation’	for	‘einfache Anerkennung’,	but	
what	one	affirms	in	the	literal	sense	are	sentences	or	propositions,	not	mental	
phenomena.	I	translate	‘anerkennen’	as	‘acknowledge’.
22.	 If	one	can	acknowledge	an	object	without	predicating	something	of	it,	Bren-
tano	argues,	predication	is	not	essential	 for	 judgement.	Brentano	goes	one	
step	 further:	all	mental	acts	we	call	 ‘judgement’	are	acknowledgements.	 In	
this	 paper	 I	will	 not	 take	 a	 stand	on	 the	 plausibility	 of	 Brentano’s	 general	
theory	of	judgement.	The	general	theory	may	well	be	false,	yet	the	part	of	it	
concerned	with	what	one	may	term	“existence	judgements”	may	still	be	true.	
it.	Rejectivists	argue	that	one	knows	what	the	sentence	operator	‘not’	
means	if	one	knows	that	it	is	correct	to	assert	that not p	if,	and	only	if,	
that p	is	correctly	denied.
According	to	Brentano,	there	is	an	attitude	that	stands	to	‘exists’	as	
rejection	does	to	‘not’:	acknowledgement.18	Similar	to	the	case	of	nega-
tion,	ontological	commitment	to	A	does	not	consist	in	concept	appli-
cation	but	 in	 thinking	of	A in a particular mode. Brentano argues that 
the attitudes of acknowledging and rejecting are prior to the concept 
of existence in the order of explanation. I will explore and defend this 
approach to existence.
I	will	 first	 outline	 the	 basic	 notions	 of	 Brentano’s	 approach	 (sec-
tion	2),	then	motivate	his	account	of	existence	(section	3)	and	discuss	
objections	to	 it	(section	4).	 In	sections	5,	6	and	7,	 I	will	develop	the	
Neo-Brentanian	view.
2. Acknowledging, Positing, and Believing-In 
Let	us	start	at	the	beginning,	namely	with	the	primitives	of	Brentano’s	
philosophy	of	mind.	Every	mental	act,	Brentano	argues,	is	either	
a	presentation,
a	loving	or	hating	of	something,
or	
an	acknowledgement	or	a	rejection,
or	it	is	definable	in	terms	of	these	acts.19	None	of	these	acts	has	a	prop-
ositional	content;	all	of	them	are,	in	an	intuitive	sense,	directed	upon	
objects,	yet	they	may	fail	to	“latch	on	to”	any	object.	
For	the	purposes	of	this	paper,	it	is	mainly	acknowledgement	and	
cognate	attitudes	that	are	of	interest.20	Let’s	start,	therefore,	by	having	
18.	 Brentano	found	the	germs	of	this	idea	in	Hume	and	Kant.	See	the	chapter	on	
Hume’s	criticism	of	the	ontological	argument	in	Brentano	1868–91.
19.	 See,	for	example,	Brentano	1995,	125/1924	II,	125.
20.	Brentano	often	called	the	non-propositional	acknowledging	attitude	simply	
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convey	our	ontological	commitments.24 Here is a literary example that 
illustrates the ontological use of ‘believe in’:
Holding	on	to	the	world	is	mostly	an	act	of	faith:	you	see	
a	little	bit	in	front	of	you	and	you	believe	in	the	rest	of	it	
both	in	time	and	space.	If	you’re	scheduled	for	a	jump	to	
Hubble	on	Tuesday,	you	believe	in	you,	in	Hubble,	in	the	
jump,	and	in	Tuesday.	(Russell	Hoban,	Fremder)
Belief-in,	however,	lacks	a	natural	opposite.	We	have,	then,	the	follow-
ing	attitudes	to	consider:
• 	factive/episodic:	acknowledging	versus	rejecting
• 	non-factive/episodic:	positing	versus	discarding
• 	non-factive/non-episodic:	belief-in	
None	of	 the	 listed	mental	 acts	 and	mental	 states	 is	 supposed	 to	be	
propositional.	Why?	Gendler	Szabó	(2003,	591f)	argues	that	believing	
that	A(s)	exists	is	not	the	same	mental	state	as	believing	in	A(s).	NN	
may	have	good	reason	to	believe	that	there	are	more	things	than	the	
things	NN	himself	believes	in.	In	this	situation,	(i)	is	true,	while	(ii)	is	
false:
(i)	NN	believes	that	things	that	NN	does	not	believe	in	exist.
(ii)	NN	believes	in	things	that	NN	does	not	believe	in.
The	difference	in	truth-value	between	(i)	and	(ii)	suggests	that	believ-
ing	that	A	exists	and	believing	in	A	are	not	the	same	thing.	But	does	
(ii)	not	have	a	reading	in	which	it	is	true?	For	instance,	one	could	give	
‘things	that	NN	does	not	believe	in’	wider	scope	than	‘NN	believes	in’:	
24.	 See	Gendler	Szabó	2003,	585,	who	uses	‘believing	in’	as	a	term	of	art,	but	in	a	
way	that	“roughly	corresponds	to	one	of	its	natural	English	uses — that	which	
places	it	into	the	loose	class	of	ontologically	committal	terms	such	as	‘accept’	
or	‘acknowledge’”.
Brentano	is	right	to	articulate	his	observations	about	awareness	by	
using	‘acknowledge’	(anerkennen).	One	cannot	be	aware	of	an	activity	
when	 this	 activity	 is	 not	 ongoing.	 This	 is	 registered	by	 the	 factivity	
of	 ‘acknowledge’.	 But	 in	 general	we	 can,	 to	 put	 it	 neutrally,	 commit	
ourselves	to	an	object	and	be	wrong:	our	commitment	can	be	correct	
or	incorrect.	Brentano	needs,	therefore,	a	non-factive	mental	act	that	
stands	to	acknowledgment	as	judgement	does	to	recognition.	There	is	
no	intensional	transitive	verb	in	German	and	English	that	refers	pre-
cisely	to	such	a	mental	act.	Brentano	sometimes	used	the	non-factive	
term	‘posit’	(setzen) to refer to the mental act he has in mind:
There	is	an	A, A	is.	Not	the	connection	of	A	with	something	
else,	but	A	considered	by	itself	and	acknowledged	by	it-
self	 (no	 combination	 but	 position)	 [keine Zusammenset-
zung, sondern eine Setzung].	(1880ff,	30;	my	translation)
‘Positing’	has	an	established	use	in	philosophy	before	Brentano.	In	his	
discussion	of	the	Ontological	Argument,	Kant	used	‘positing’	to	make	
clear	what	existential	judgement	consists	in:	such	a	 ‘judgement’	is	a	
positing	(A	598).23	Moreover,	while	we	lack	a	philosophical	analysis	of	
the	term,	talk	of	positing	is	well	established	and	intelligible	indepen-
dent	of	such	an	analysis.	I	will	therefore	use	it	as	a	non-factive	alterna-
tive	to	Brentano’s	‘acknowledge’.
The	verb	‘to	posit’	signifies	a	mental	act.	Is	there	a	mental	state	that	
is	 initiated	or	manifested	by	positing	something?	English	has	 the	 in-
tensional	transitive	construction	‘S	believes	in	A’	as	well	as	the	propo-
sitional	one	‘S	believes	that	p’.	‘Believes	in’	takes	as	complements	sin-
gular	terms	(‘Santa	Claus’),	plural	terms	(‘dwarves’),	and	mass	terms	
(‘dark	matter’).	The	same	distinction	can	be	found	in	German	(‘glauben 
an’	versus	 ‘glauben, daß’).	Sometimes	 ‘believe	in’	 is	used	to	express	a	
positive	evaluative	attitude	(‘I	believe	in	love’),	but	often	we	use	it	to	
23.	 Rosenkoetter	2009,	545,	expands	on	this.
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second	option	is	preferable.	For	instance,	I	may	believe	in	phlogiston,	
although	there	is	no	such	substance.	This	suggests	that	belief-in	and	
positing	 are	 attitudes	 that	 have	modes	 of	 presentation	 as	 their	 con-
tents.	These	modes	of	presentation	can	be	understood	on	the	model	
of	the	sense	of	plural	and	singular	terms.	But	while	the	attitudes	have	
modes	of	presentation	as	their	contents,	they	are	not	relations	to	these	
modes	of	presentation:	in	the	good	case,	they	are	mediated	relations	
to	things.26	Hence,	one	can	falsely	and	truly	believe	in	something,	and	
one	can	come	to	posit	an	object	(believe	in	it)	after	being	doubtful	or	
neutral	with	respect	to	its	existence.	
This	claim	about	the	nature	of	belief-in	and	related	attitudes	is	inde-
pendent	of	the	semantics	of	names	that	may	be	used	to	express	them.	
The	name	‘Pluto’	may	be	directly	referential:	its	meaning	or	semantic	
content	is	exhausted	by	its	referent.	Yet,	the	attitude	one	presents	one-
self	as	having	by	asserting	‘Pluto	exists’	is	a	relation	between	a	thinker	
and	 a	 thought	 that	 involves	 a	mode	 of	 presentation.	However,	 this	
thought	is	the	semantic	content	neither	of	‘Pluto	exists’	nor	of	attitude	
ascriptions	like	‘John	believes	that	Pluto	is	a	planet’.	The	semantic	con-
tent	of	our	assertions	underspecifies	how	the	mental	state	expressed	
represents	the	world.	Consider	an	independent	example:	I	utter,	with	
assertoric	force,	 ‘Pluto	is	a	planet’.	 I	am	bound	to	think	of	Pluto	in	a	
particular	way,	and	you	will	do	so	too,	when	you	accept	what	I	say.	But	
we	may	not	think	of	it	in	the	same	way.	The	view	that	names	and	other	
singular	terms	are	directly	referential,	or	the	weaker	thesis	that	they	
are	non-descriptive,	is	compatible	with	a	metaphysics	of	the	attitudes	
we	ascribe	that	takes	them	to	involve	modes	of	presentation.27	Some	
theorists	of	direct	reference,	for	example,	take	these	modes	of	presen-
tation	to	be	pragmatically	conveyed.
According	to	Brentano,	a	thinker	can	acknowledge	an	object	and	
26.	This	point	is	argued	for	in	detail	in	Grzankowski	2014,	10.
27.	 For	 a	 view	 that	 combines	 the	 outlined	 metaphysics	 of	 attitudes	 with	 the	
semantics	of	direct	reference,	see	Salmon	1986,	105–14.	For	discussion,	see	
Braun	1998,	565ff.
Things	that	NN	does	not	believe	in	are	such	that	NN	be-
lieves	in	them.
Now	this	seems	to	be	just	a	grammatical	change,	not	a	change	in	the	
logical	 form	of	 the	 sentence.	Gendler	Szabó	 (2003,	 593–4)	makes	 a	
good	 case	 that	 while	 quantifier	 phrases	 exhibit	 scope	 ambiguities,	
bare	plurals	don’t.	A	sentence	like	‘John	looks	for	unicorns’	has	only	
one	reading,	in	which	‘unicorns’	is	in	the	scope	of	‘John	looks	for’,	be-
cause	on	no	understanding	does	 the	 sentence	 commit	 us	 to	 the	 ex-
istence	of	unicorns.	The	 same	goes	 for	 ‘NN	believes	 in’	 and	 ‘things	
that	NN	does	not	believe	in’.	The	sentence	does	not	commit	us	to	the	
existence	of	things	that	NN	does	not	believe	in.	Gendler	Szabó	(2003,	
592)	generalizes	this	conclusion:	If	believing	in	A	is	not	believing	that	
A	exists,	acknowledging	A	 is	not	acknowledging	that	A	exists,	admit-
ting	A	is	not	admitting	that	A	exists,	etc.	
The	idea	that	belief-in	is	a	non-propositional	attitude	is	also	made	
plausible	 by	 considerations	 about	 other	non-propositional	 attitudes.	
Liking	is	a	plausible	candidate	for	another	non-propositional	attitude.25 
It	seems	plausible	that	liking	something	is	not	a	propositional	attitude,	
but	that	one	can	like	an	object	A	only	if	one	“takes	it	to	be”.	If	we	hold	
that	“taking	to	be”	is	a	belief	that	something	exists,	we	make	the	non-
propositional	 attitude	 liking something	 dependent	on	a	propositional	
attitude.	Again	this	seems	implausible.	Dogs	like	bones,	but	don’t	have	
the	propositional	belief	that	bones	exist.	They	can	like	bones	without	
having	such	beliefs,	because	they	believe	in	bones.
Belief-in	is	a	non-propositional	attitude.	There	are	two	ways	to	un-
derstand	the	metaphysics	of	this	attitude.	Either	the	non-propositional	
attitude	is	a	two-place	relation	between	a	thinker	and	an	object,	or	it	
is	a	two-place	relation	between	a	thinker	and	a	mode	of	presentation.	
In	some	cases	in	which	the	latter	relation	holds,	there	is	a	further	rela-
tion	between	the	mode	of	presentation	and	an	object.	Brentano	does	
not	explicitly	argue	for	one	of	these	options.	But	with	respect	to	the	
non-factive	attitude	of	belief-in	and	the	non-factive	act	of	positing,	the	
25.	 For	good	arguments	for	this	conclusion,	see	Grzankowski	2015,	381f.
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3. The Motivation of Brentano’s Theory of Existence
If	believing	in	A	(acknowledging/positing	A)	is	not	believing	that	A	ex-
ists	(acknowledging/positing	that	A	exists),	yet	we	take	these	attitudes	
to	 be	 ontologically	 committing,	 this	 commitment	 is	 independent	 of	
the	propositional	content	of	the	act	or	state.	This	makes	it	plausible	
that	the	commitment	is	due	to	the	psychological	mode	in	which	one	
thinks	of	A	when	one	acknowledges	or	believes	in	it.	As	Kriegel	puts	it:
[On	 Brentano’s	 view],	 to	 think	 that	Obama	 exists	 is	 to	
represent-as-existent	Obama.	The	content	of	the	thought	
is	 thus	 exhausted	 by	Obama.	 Existence	 does	 not	 come	
into	the	thought	at	the	level	of	content,	but	at	the	level	of	
attitude.	(Kriegel	2015,	87)
An	independent	example	of	commitment	in	virtue	of	attitude	mode	is	
propositional	judgement.	On	pain	of	vicious	regress,	not	all	commit-
ments	to	the	truth	of	a	proposition	p	can	be	a	matter	of	content — that	
is,	represent	p	as	being	true	or	as	falling	under	the	concept	of	truth.	
For	 representing	 p	 as	 true	 in	 this	way	 is	 just	 thinking	 a	more	 com-
plex	thought,	namely	the	thought	that	p	is	true.	Hence,	the	question	
of	whether	we	have	committed	ourselves	to	the	truth	of	this	distinct	
thought	arises	again.30	Consequently,	there	must	be	a	way	to	commit	
oneself	 to	p’s	being	true	that	does	not	bring	p	under	the	concept	of	
truth.	It	must	be	a	matter	of	attitude	mode	and	not	of	attitude	content.	
Similarly,	 there	 is	 a	 basic	 form	of	 ontological	 commitment	 that	 is	 a	
matter	of	attitude	mode	and	not	of	attitude	content.	
Now	the	assumption	that	there	is	a	mental	act	of	ontological	com-
mitment	is	suggestive.	But,	 in	addition	to	the	mental	act,	we	need	a	
concept	of	existence	that	can	be	part	of	propositions	and	is	expressed	
by	‘exists’	or	‘is’.	For	example,	we	are	able	to	speculate	whether	some-
thing	might	not	have	existed	or	whether	there	could	exist	an	object	
of	a	certain	kind.	These	are	not	speculations	about	whether	someone	
might	acknowledge	an	object	or	not.	Without	a	concept	of	existence	
30.	This	point	is	made	in	Frege	1892a,	35–6	[164].	
believe	 in	 it	without	being	able	 to	entertain	propositions	about	 it.28 
How	can	one	get	a	theoretical	understanding	of	such	basic	non-prop-
ositional	attitudes?	The	general	 functionalist	strategy	 is	 to	character-
ise	an	attitude	by	outlining	its	place	in	a	web	of	other	attitudes.	If	we	
employ	 this	 strategy,	 we	 can	 characterize	 positing	 and	 belief-in	 by	
outlining	their	place	in	a	web	of	non-propositional	attitudes	and	feel-
ings.29 Knowledge of the place of belief-in in the web of these attitudes 
is knowledge of what belief-in is. The ‘input side’ of the web is, in part, 
given by statements such as:
Ceteris paribus,	if	S	attention	is	drawn	to	x, S	will	posit	x.
Ceteris paribus,	if	S	acts	upon	x, S	believes	in	x.
Ceteris paribus,	if	S	perceives	x, S	believes	in	x.
In	addition,	there	are	statements	that	specify	which	attitudes	require	
belief-in	for	their	rationality:
It	is	rational	to	fear	x	and	act	accordingly	only	if	one	be-
lieves	in	it.	
It	is	rational	to	admire	x	and	act	accordingly	only	if	one	
believes	in	it.
The	functional	characterisation	makes	intelligible	how	thinkers	who	
have	no	propositional	attitudes	can	believe	in	objects.
28.	We	can	ascribe	such	attitudes	only	by	using	propositional	constructions.	But	
ascribing	an	attitude	is	one	thing,	the	attitude	itself	another.	
29.	The	basic	idea	can	be	found	in	Textor	2007,	section	4.	The	details	are	changed	
below.	Kriegel	2015,	98,	characterizes	the	attitude	in	consideration	by	locat-
ing	it	in	Brentano’s	classification	scheme	for	mental	phenomena.	But	this	will	
be	helpful	 to	and/or	 convince	only	 those	who	are	 inclined	 to	accept	Bren-
tano’s	classification	scheme.	
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is	not	 “blind”:	 she	does	 it	with	a	 sense	 that	 it	 is	 the	ap-
propriate	thing	to	do,	that	this	is	where	the	cube	belongs,	
that	 this	 is	 what	 she	 ought	 to	 be	 doing	with	 the	 cube.	
(Ginsborg	2006,	361)
One	does	not	need	 to	possess	 the	concepts	of	 sorting	or	correct-
ness	to	have	the	sense	of	correctness	under	consideration:	the	child	
can	simply	be	aware	that	what	she	does	right	now	should	be	done	in	
this way.34	It	strikes	her	that	the	cube	belongs	there	and	that	putting	it	
anywhere	else	would	be	wrong.	
Something	similar	goes	for	the	thinker	who	acknowledges	an	ob-
ject.	When	I	acknowledge	an	object,	I	have	a	sense	that	this	is	the	ap-
propriate	or	right	thing	to	do.	In	order	to	have	this	sense,	I	don’t	need	
to	 judge	 that	my	acknowledgement	is	right.	My	sense	that	my	judge-
ment	is	correct	is	manifest	in	my	emotional	responses:	If	you	convince	
me	that	an	object	I	have	acknowledged	does	not	exist,	I	will	respond	
with	the	same	emotions	as	when	I	do	something	incorrectly.	I	may	be	
angry	or	blame	myself,	etc.
However,	if	I	am	able	to	reflect	on	my	acknowledgement	of	A,	I	can	
only	on	pain	of	 irrationality	 refuse	 to	 judge	 that	A	 is	 to	be	acknowl-
edged.35	Brentano	holds	that	if	one	is	able	to	form	a	view	about	one’s	
acknowledgements	and	one	acknowledges	A, one	will,	when	one	pays	
attention	to	it,	acknowledge	that	A is to be acknowledged:
[A]nyone	who	takes	something	to	be	 true	will	not	only	
acknowledge	 the	 object,	 but,	 when	 asked	 whether	 the	
object	is	to	be	acknowledged,	will	also	acknowledge	the	
object’s	 to-be-acknowledgedness,	 i. e.	 its	 truth	 (which	 is	
all	 that	 is	meant	by	 this	barbarous	 expression). The	ex-
pression	‘to	take	something	to	be	true’	may	be	connected	
34.	 Ibid.,	362.
35.	 This	is	related	to	the	view	that	outright	belief	that	p	commits	one	to	the	belief	
that	one	knows	that	p.	On	this,	see	Owens	2000,	37,	and	Huemer	2011,	2f.	In	
Brentano’s	terminology,	one	would	say	that	if	someone	believes	that	p,	he	is	
committed	to	believing	correctly.	
that	can	be	part	of	predicational	thoughts,	one	would	be	deprived	of	
the	possibility	of	such	speculations.	
Brentano	argued	that	there	is	a	concept	of	existence.	We	have	seen	
that	when	we	acknowledge	objects,	we	don’t	exercise	the	concept	of	
existence.	This	enables	Brentano	to	give	a	rational	reconstruction	of	
how	we	arrive	at	 the	concept	of	existence	 that	 starts	 from	consider-
ations	about	acknowledgement.31 He credited Aristotle with this idea:
Aristotle	had	already	recognized	that	[the	concept	of	ex-
istence]	is	acquired	by	reflection	on	the	affirming	judge-
ment.	(Brentano	1889,	27	[45],	my	translation)32
In	 his	 unpublished	 Logic	 Lectures	 (EL	 80),	 Brentano	 spells	 out	 the	
Aristotelian	 thesis.	His	 starting	 point	 is	 the	 following	 consideration	
about	judgement:
What	 does	 someone	 do	 who	makes	 a	 judgement,	 who	
acknowledges	and	rejects?	Obviously	he	treats	what	he	
judges	as	something	that	is	to	be	judged	as	he	does	judge	
it.	If	he	acknowledges	it,	he	treats	it	as	something	that	is	to	
be	acknowledged;	if	he	rejects	it,	he	treats	it	as	something	
to	be	rejected.	(Brentano	1880ff,	89;	my	translation)33
When	I	acknowledge	something	A,	 I	am	committed	to	taking	my	
acknowledgement	 as	 correct,	 fitting,	 or	 appropriate,	 as	 something	 I	
should	do.	Independently	of	Brentano,	Ginsborg	made	a	strong	case	
that	an	awareness	that	what	one	does	is	“the	appropriate	thing	to	do”	
is	distinctive	of	our	 thought	 and	perception.	A	 child	who	 is	 sorting	
geometrical	shapes	will	have	this	sense:
When	she	puts	a	cube	together	with	the	other	cubes	rath-
er	than	with	the	spheres,	her	action,	even	if	unhesitating,	
31.	 Brentano	1995,	163/1924	II,	52.
32.	 Page	 numbers	 of	 the	 German	 text	 are	 given	 in	 brackets. 
33.	 Thanks	to	Sarah	Tropper	for	improving	the	translation.
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Kriegel disagrees with this reading of Brentano:
The	view	is	not	that	existence	is	the	property	whose	na-
ture	 is	 being-fittingly-acceptable.	 In	 fact,	 for	 Brentano	
there	is	no	such	property	as	existence,	though	there	are	
of	course	existents.	This	is	precisely	why	existence-com-
mitment	cannot	be	part	of	the	content	of	a	mental	state.	
There	is	not	some	aspect	of	the	world,	or	of	things	in	it,	
that	we	may	call	existence.	(Kriegel	2015,	91)
As	we	have	seen,	it	is	right	to	say	that	existence	is	not	predicated	in	
acknowledgment,	but	this	does	not	imply	that	there	is	no	mental	act	or	
state	in	whose	content	a	first-order	predicational	concept	of	existence	
figures.	Brentano	says,	 in	a	passage	quoted	by	Kriegel	(2015,	91,	Fn),	
that	‘exists’	is	not	a	material predicate:
In	calling	an	object	good	we	are	not	giving	it	a	material	
(sachliches)	predicate,	as	we	do	when	we	call	something	
red	or	round	or	warm	or	thinking.	In	this	respect	the	ex-
pressions	good	and	bad	are	like the expressions existent and 
nonexistent.	 In	 using	 the	 latter	 [‘existent’	 and	 ‘non-exis-
tent’],	we	do	not	intend	to	add	yet	another	to	the	deter-
mining	characteristics	of	the	thing	in	question;	we	wish	
rather	to	say	that	whoever	acknowledges	a	certain	thing	
and	rejects	another	certain	thing	makes	a	true	judgement.	
(Brentano	1973,	90	[144];	my	emphasis)
At	first	sight	it	is	baffling	that	Brentano	classifies	‘good’	and	‘exists’	to-
gether.	But	expounding	the	analogy	between	‘good’	and	‘exists’	helps	
us	 to	understand	Brentano’s	 view.	Let	us	 start	with	Brentano’s	 treat-
ment	of	‘good’.	When	I	utter,	with	assertoric	force,	‘Champagne	is	good’,	
I	don’t	intend	my	audience	to	come	to	a	judgement	about	champagne	
to	the	effect	that	it	is	such-and-such: ‘good’ is	not	a real or	determining	
predicate.	 I	 intend	them	to	 judge	that	one	ought	 to	 like	champagne.	
(See	ibid.)	While	‘good’	is	not	a	real	or	determining	predicate,	it	still	
expresses	the	normative	concept	(‘is	to	be	liked’)	under	which	objects	
with	this.	The	expression	 ‘to	take	something	to	be	false’	
will	 receive	 an	 analogous	 explication.	 (Brentano	 1995,	
187–8/1924	II,	48–9;	in	part	my	translation)
Let’s	first	note	that	there	is	a	prima facie	objection	to	Brentano’s	claim.36 
In	 general,	 I	might	 find	myself	 unable	 to	 believe	 that	 p,	while	 also	
thinking	that	 there	 is	strong	evidence	that	 favours	that	p.	Belief	 is	a	
multi-track	 disposition	 to	 feel,	 think,	 and	 behave	 in	 certain	 ways.	
Some	of	these	dispositions	are	not	easily	changed	even	if	one	has	evi-
dence	for	or	against	the	truth	of	what	one	believes.	However,	while	
it	 is	 therefore	possible	 that	 someone	may	honestly	 and	 truly	 assert,	
‘Pluto	 is,	 but	 one	ought	not	 to	believe	 in	 it’,	 the	person	making	 the	
assertion	 thereby	 shows	 that	 she	 does	 not	 live	 up	 to	 the	 standards	
of	correct	judgement.	Hence,	one	can	acknowledge	A,	know	that	one	
does	so,	and	yet	refuse	to	acknowledge	that	A	is	to	be	acknowledged,	
but	only on pain of irrationality.37 
The	thesis	so	revised	is	sufficient	for	Brentano’s	purposes:	if	one	is	
able	to	form	a	view	about	one’s	acknowledgements	and	one	acknowl-
edges	A, one	will,	when	one	pays	attention	to	it,	acknowledge	that	A 
is	to	be	acknowledged	or	incur	blame	for	being	irrational.	If	one	forms	
a	rational	view	about	one’s	acknowledgements,	one	can	therefore	dis-
cover	a	property	of	A:	it is to be acknowledged.	Brentano	coined	an,	as	he	
says,	“barbaric”	term	for	this	property:	the	property	of	“to-be-acknowl-
edged-ness”	(Anzuerkennensein) (Brentano 1995, 187/1924 II, 89). 
When	we	simply	acknowledge	an	object,	we	don’t	predicate	 this	
property	of	it.	But	when	we	acknowledge	something,	we	are	commit-
ted	to	 its	 to-be-acknowledged-ness	 in	the	sense	explained	above.	 In	
sum,	acknowledgement	 itself	 is	a	non-predicational	mental	act:	one	
simply	acknowledges	an	object.	But	we	can,	by	reflecting	on	acknowl-
edgement	and	articulating	 its	commitments,	discover	 that	 there	 is	a	
property	of	to-be-acknowledged-ness.	This	property,	Brentano	argues,	
is	nothing	but	the	property	of	existence.
36.	Thanks	to	an	anonymous	referee	for	drawing	me	out	here.
37.	 See	Owens	2002,	383.
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x	is	correctly	positable	if,	and	only	if,	
every	suitably	equipped	and	placed	thinker	would,	under	
suitable	conditions,	acknowledge	x.
Husserl,	who	discussed	Brentano’s	view	in	detail	 in	his	lectures,	out-
lines	the	problems	with	this	construal	of	Brentano’s	view:
Maybe	there	are	objects	that	cannot	be	correctly	acknowl-
edged	by	any	intellectual	being.	We	are	to	understand	the	
possibility	not	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 relates	 to	 the	 real	 ca-
pacities	of	beings	that	have	the	faculty	of	judgement,	but	
as	follows:	An	object	exists,	means	nothing	but	this:	if	a	
judgement	were	to	acknowledge	the	object,	it	would	be	
correct.	(Husserl	1896,	218;	my	translation)
It	is	possible	that	there	are	objects	we	will	never	acknowledge	or	that	
are	 such	 that	 if	 one	 tried	 to	 acknowledge	 them,	 they	would	 decon-
struct	and	can	therefore	not	be	correctly	acknowledged.
Valicella	(2001,	316)	argues	 that	weakening	the	modal	reading	of	
Brentano’s	view	to	
x	is	correctly	positable	if,	and	only	if,	
it	 is	 logically	 possible	 that	 there	 is	 a	 suitably	 equipped	
and	placed	thinker	who,	under	suitable	conditions,	would	
acknowledge	x
leads	to	new	problems.	For	even	if	there	is	no	x,	it	is	surely	possible	
that	there	are	beings	able	to	acknowledge	x	in	the	right	conditions.
Fortunately	 Brentano	does	 not	 construe	 his	 view	of	 existence	 in	
terms	of	possibility.	A	beautiful	object	merits	or	deserves	positive	ap-
preciation	whether	there	is	someone	who	can	so	appreciate	it	or	not,	
and	whether	it	is	possible	that	there	is	someone	who	can	so	appreciate	
is	 hard	 to	 fathom.	 But	 the	main	 point	 is	 that	 neither	 Brentano	 nor	Marty	
hold	the	view	Meinong	criticizes.	Marty	(1908,	314),	for	instance,	argues	that	
something	exists	if,	and	only	if,	it	merits	acknowledgement.
fall.	The	same	goes	for	‘exists’.	It	expresses	the	normative	concept	(‘to	
be	believed	in/acknowledged’)	under	which	objects	fall.	I	will	come	
back	to	this	thesis	in	section	7.
Brentano’s	view,	then,	has	two	components:
A	non-predicational	component:	the	attitude	of	belief-in	
and	the	acts	of	positing	and	acknowledging
A	 predicational	 component:	 the	 concept	 expressed	 in	
existence-statements	and	thoughts	
One	discovers	and	understands	the	concept	of	existence	if	one	(i)	be-
lieves	 in	 (posits,	acknowledges)	objects	and	(ii)	 forms	a	view	about	
one’s	 attitude	 and	 its	 objects.	The	attitude	 is	 one	 that	one	ought	 to	
have — it	 is	 appropriate — and	 the	 object	 is	 one	 towards	which	 one	
ought	to	have	the	attitude.	
Brentano	proposed	his	account	of	existence	as	a	genealogy	of	the	
concept	of	existence.	I	am	not	sure	which	evidence	could	be	found	for	
the	 claim	 that	humans	acquire	 the	 concept	of	 existence	 in	 this	way.	
But	we	can	set	this	aside	and	take	Brentano	to	locate	existence	in	our	
web	of	concepts.	Existence	is	involved	in	the	normative	commitments	
of	acknowledging	and	positing.	This	allows	Brentano	to	shed	light	on	
this	 concept:	 existence	 is	 an	 evaluative	 first-level	 concept:	 ‘x	 exists’	
means	‘x	is	to	be	acknowledged’.	
4. Brentano’s Analysis of Existence
In	this	section	I	want	to	have	a	close	look	at	Brentano’s	analysis	of	ex-
istence	that	is	a	by-product	of	his	genealogy	of	existence.	
Let	us	first	get	clear	about	what	he	is	not	saying.	Brentano	does	not	
propose	that	existence is being posited/acknowledged:	there	are	things	we	
neither	have	nor	will	ever	acknowledge.	Neither	did	he	hold	that	exis-
tence	consists	in	correct	positability	or	acknowledgeability.38 Consider: 
38.	Meinong	(1910,	62)	 takes	Marty	 (1908,	314)	 to	define	existence	as	possible	
acknowledgement	(Anerkanntwerdenkönnen)	and	goes	on	to	criticize	the	defi-
nition	as	leading	to	the	“dissolution	of	being	into	possibility”.	The	criticism	
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Harry	suffices	to	make	it	true.	(At	least,	provided	he	is	es-
sentially	a	dog,	and	so	could	not	have	existed	without	a	
dog	existing.	[…])	Dog	Milo	also	suffices	to	make	it	true;	
and	so	does	any	other	dog.	(Lewis	1992,	216)
A	truth-maker	for	the	sentence	‘There	are	dogs’	is	Milo,	another	is	Har-
ry,	etc.	If	existential	judgements	are	true	because	of	things,	the	same	
goes	 for	Brentano’s	positings.	 If	 there	were	finitely	many	 things,	we	
could	make	do	with	a	list	like:
Harry	makes	true	positing	Harry;
Fred	makes	true	positing	Fred;
That	 2	 =	 2	 is	 among	 the	 things	 that	 make	 true	 positing	
propositions;
Oxygen	makes	true	positing	oxygen.
But	how	can	one	specify	in	a	general	manner	when	a	positing	is	true?	
Using	the	universal	quantifier,	we	can	say:
Every	object	x	is	such	that	one	posits	x	truly	if,	and	only	
if,	one	posits	x.
No	further	specification	of	the	domain	of	the	quantifier	 is	necessary	
or	possible.	The	meaning	of	the	words	used,	the	principle	of	charity,	
and	the	context	of	utterance	determine	that	the	quantifiers	range	over	
everything	there	is.
Whether	we	need	to	revise	or	extend	our	account	of	truth	for	posit-
ing	depends	on	 further	arguments.	Are	 there	 things	 that	are	not	ob-
jects?	Are	there	pluralities,	or	are	there	only	objects	we	refer	to	with	
singular	and	plural	 terms?42	Here	 I	will	 leave	open	whether	such	ex-
tensions	are	necessary,	because	my	main	aim	is	to	articulate	the	basic	
framework	that	may	need	extension.
The	 second	 problem	 raised	 by	 (BrentanoE1)	 is	 that it	 seems	
42.	 See	Boolos	1984,	449.
it	or	not.	The	object	is	to	be	appreciated	whether	one	can	do	so	or	not.	
Similarly,	an	object	exists	if,	and	only	if,	it	is	to	be	posited	or	acknowl-
edged;	if	acknowledging	(positing)	it	is	right	or	appropriate.	Brentano	
expresses	this	idea	in	his	lectures	as	follows:
(BrentanoE1)	 x	 exists	 if,	 and	 only	 if,	 x	 is	 to	 be	 posited/
acknowledged	and	not	rejected.39
Whether	there	is	anyone	who	has	or	can	have	this	attitude	is	a	differ-
ent	question.40
Now	(BrentanoE1)	raises	two	main	problems.	
First,	we	need	to	ask	when	an	acknowledgement	 is	correct	or	ap-
propriate.41 The only answer that makes Brentano’s definitions look 
like definitions of existence and not replacements is this: One posits x 
correctly if, and only if, x exists. Brentano himself suggests this answer:
Whether	 I	 say	 that	 an	 affirmative	 judgement	 is	 true,	 or	
its	object	exists,	or	whether	 I	 say	 that	a	negative	 judge-
ment	is	true,	or	its	object	does	not	exist,	in	both	cases	I	
say	one and the same thing.	(Brentano	1889,	28	Fn	[45	Fn],	
my	translation)
If	 this	 is	 right,	one	can	understand	correct	acknowledgement	by	ap-
peal	to	existence,	but	not	the	other	way	round.	If	one	wants	to	turn	the	
direction	of	explanation	around,	one	needs	an	answer	to	the	question	
‘When	is	positing	T	correct	(incorrect)?’	that	does	not	rely	on	the	no-
tion	of	existence.
How	do	we	solve	this	problem?	Lewis	points	the	way:
It’s	 easy	 to	 believe	 that	 some	 truths	 have	 truth-makers,	
for	instance	the	existential	truth	that	there	are	dogs.	Dog	
39.	See	also	Marty	1918,	201.	In	other	work,	he	preferred	to	use	a	conditional:	‘T	is’	
means	that	if	one	acknowledges	or	posits	T,	one	acknowledges	or	posits	truly,	
while	if	one	rejects	or	discards	T,	one	rejects	or	discards	falsely.	(See	Brentano	
1904,	48	[79].)
40.	Hence,	Vallicella’s	criticisms	in	his	2001,	315–6,	miss	their	target.	
41.	 I	take	Husserl	1896,	218,	to	suggest	this	objection.	
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the	next	section,	I	will	show	how	one	can	take	this	criticism	on	board	
without	giving	up	the	core	of	Brentano’s	view.45 
5. The Neo-Brentanian View of Existence 
Brentano	made	a	good	case	for	the	thesis	that	non-propositional	and	
ontologically	committing	attitudes	are	prior	to	the	concept	of	existence.	
But	it	turned	out	to	be	implausible	that	the	concept	of	existence	can	be	
analysed	with	recourse	to	correct	acknowledgement.	This	first	stab	at	
revising	Brentano’s	view	will	become	clearer	if	we	look	at	recent	work	
on	negation.	Rejectivists	hold	that,	equipped	with	the	distinction	be-
tween	rejection	and	acceptance,	we	can	understand	negation:
The	 leading	 idea	 of	 rejectivism	 is	 that	 a	 grasp	 of	 the	
distinction	between	 [assent	and	dissent]	 is	prior	 to	our	
understanding	 of	 negation	 as	 a	 sentence	 operator,	 this	
operator	then	being	explicable	as	applying	to	A	to	yield	
something	assent	to	which	is	tantamount	to	dissent	from	
A.	(Humberstone	2000,	331)
The	 rejectivist	will	explain	 the	sense	of	 the	sentence-forming	opera-
tor	‘not’	(‘¬’)	by	rules	of	introduction	and	elimination	whose	starting	
points	are	acts	of	rejecting	and	assenting.	Let	‘−’	be	a	force-indicator	
with	rejective	force	and	‘+’	its	counterpart	with	affirmative	force,	which	
can	be	used	to	reject	or	accept	propositions.	With	this	in	mind,	Rumfitt	
proposes	the	following	introduction	and	elimination	rules	for	‘¬’:46
45.	 Kriegel	renders	Brentano’s	view	as	follows:	‘To	be	is	to	be	a	fitting	object	of	
a	positive	objectual	existential	state	with	world-to-mind	direction’	 (Kriegel	
2015,	99).	 If	we	take	it	 to	be	an	analytic	definition	of	existence,	 it	 is	too	de-
manding.	 John	can	believe	that	Superman	does	not	exist	without	knowing	
about	the	world–mind	direction	of	fit,	etc.	Moreover,	it	is	not	necessary	for	
the	mental	state	to	have	the	world–mind	direction.	My	current	visual	sensa-
tion	 is	 a	fitting	object	of	 an	acknowledgement,	but	 this	 acknowledgement	
need	not	have	a	world–mind	direction	of	fit.	My	consciousness	of	my	current	
visual	sensation	has	no	direction	of	fit,	because	it	is	factive.
46.	 See	Rumfitt	2001,	802.
implausible	 to hold	 that	 the	concept	of	correct	acknowledgement	 is	
a	mark	of	the	concept	of	existence.	Husserl	raises	exactly	this	point:
Should	the	concept	of	judgement	be	really	contained	in	
the	concept	of	existence	as	a	component?	(Husserl	1896,	
218,	my	translation)43
But,	on	the	face	of	it,	this	is	just	a	statement	of	Brentano’s	view,	not	a	
criticism	of	it.	In	his	review	of Brentano’s The Origin of Our Knowledge 
of Right and Wrong,	Moore	(1903,	117)	wielded	the	open-question	argu-
ment	 against	 Brentano’s	 definition	 and	 thereby	 supported	Husserl’s	
intuition.44 
Moore	argued	as	 follows:	 In	general,	 if	 the	concept	of	being	F is 
just	the	concept	of	being	G,	the	question	whether	everything	that	is	an	
F	is	a	G	and	the	other	way	round	is	not	open.	A	question	is	not	open	
if	one	cannot	ask	it	on	pain	of	manifesting	one’s	failure	to	grasp	the	
concepts	involved.	For	example,	if	one	seriously	asks	whether	a	vixen	
is	a	female	fox,	one	thereby	shows	that	one	does	not	understand	one	
of	the	words	used	in	formulating	the	question.	However,	it	is	an	open	
question	whether	it	is	indeed	true	that	everything	that	exists	is	to	be	
acknowledged	and	vice versa.	It	is	not	a	sign	of	the	failure	to	grasp	the	
concepts	of	existence	and	correct	acknowledgement	 if	one	wonders	
whether	something	exists	if,	and	only	if,	it	is	to	be	acknowledged.	
Moore’s	objection	suggests	that	grasping	the	concept	of	existence	
does	not	 consist	 in	 knowledge	of	 a	definition,	 i. e.	 knowledge	of	 an	
analysis	of	 the	concept	 in	 its	marks.	 It	 seems	perfectly	possible	 that	
one	 could	 use	 ‘exists’	 correctly	 without	 having	 the	 concept	 of	 ac-
knowledgement.	I	can	utter	‘Superman	exists’	with	understanding,	yet	
be	puzzled	by	the	question	‘So	you	take	him	to	be	acknowledged?’	In	
43.	 See	also	Meinong	1910,	62	Fn.
44.	More	precisely,	Moore	wielded	it	against	Brentano’s	definition	of	truth	as	cor-
rect	judgement.	But	since	Brentano	takes	judgement	to	be	acknowledgement	
of	objects,	truth	and	existence	coincide.	
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be	based	on	or	constituted	by	propositional	knowledge	whose	content	
is	given	by	these	rules.	
Let	us	now	apply	this	model	to	‘exist’.	I	will	use	‘!’	for	positing	and	‘¬’	
for	rejective	force.	The	introduction	and	elimination	rules	are	straight-
forward.	Let	‘T’	be	shorthand	for	an	arbitrary	singular,	plural,	or	mass	
term.	The	rules	for	the	predicate	‘E’	are:
 ‘E’ Introduction  ‘E’ Elimination 
 !	T	   +	[E	(T)] 
	 +	[E	(T)]		 	 !	T	
 
 /T	 	 	 –	[E	(T)]	  
	 -	[(E	(T)]	 	 /T	 	 	
There	is	some	flexibility	here:	Someone	who	is	sceptical	about	denial	
can	use	‘¬’	instead	of	‘–’.	If	we	hold	that	acknowledgement	has	no	op-
posite,	we	can	make	do	with	the	rules	that	only	use	‘!’.	In	either	case,	
the	rules	for	‘E’	are	harmonious.	The	rules	given	are	those	we	should	
expect	if	we	have	a	sense	of	rightness	of	acknowledgement:	if	we	ac-
knowledge	A	and	are	aware	of	what	we	are	doing,	we	are	disposed	to	
assent	to	‘E(a)’.	
This	move	solves	the	problem	raised	by	Moore.	We	don’t	need	the	
concept	of	positing,	etc.,	 to	 introduce	 the	concept	of	existence.	Our	
grasp	of	the	concept	of	existence	consists	in	the	disposition	to	judge	
that	T	 exists	 if	 one	 posits	 (acknowledges)	T	 and	 to	 posit	 (acknowl-
edge)	T	if	one	judges	that	T exists without any further premise. Some-
one who masters the concept of existence finds these transitions from 
positing to judgement primitively compelling and not in need of fur-
ther justification.
The	 Neo-Brentanian	 view	 of	 existence	 consists	 of	 the	 following	
three	core	claims:
 ‘¬’ Introduction  ‘¬’ Elimination
 −	P	   −	(¬	P)		  
	 +	(¬	P)	 	 	 +	P	
 +	P	   +	(¬	P)		
	 −	(¬	P)	 	 	 −	P
The	point	of	these	rules	becomes	clear	when	they	are	compared	with	
the	classical	rules:
 ‘¬’ Introduction  ‘¬’ Elimination
	 P,	X	 	 	 ¬	¬	P
	 :	 	 	 P
 ⊥     
	 ¬	P	 	 	 	 	
The	classical	rules	for	negation	are	not	harmonious;	roughly	speaking,	
one	can	infer	more	via	the	elimination	rules	than	one	has	put	in	via	
the	introduction	rules.47	The	rejectivist	rules	are	harmonious:	one	gets	
out	only	what	one	has	put	in.	While	this	is	an	important	property	of	
the	rules	that	the	rejectivist	has	provided,	I	won’t	take	a	stand	on	the	
plausibility	of	rejectivism	here.	For	the	rejective	account	of	negation	
will	only	serve	as	a	model	for	a	Brentanian	view	of	existence.	The	plau-
sibility	of	the	Brentanian	view	is	independent	of	the	rejective	view	of	
negation,	since	Brentano’s	primitives	are	different	from	the	primitives	
of	the	rejectivist.	
The	rejectivist	takes	our	understanding	of	‘not’	to	consist	in	the	ca-
pacity	to	make	or	endorse	inferences	that	follow	the	rules	of	‘not’	in-
troduction	and	elimination.	There	is	no	reason	to	take	the	capacity	to	
47.	 See	Rumfitt	2001,	791.
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Yet	one	needs	 to	distinguish	existence	 from	other	first-order	con-
cepts	 that	 subsume	everything.	How?	The	Neo-Brentanian	 view	an-
swers	this	question	by	characterising	the	sense	of	‘exists’	in	terms	of	
introduction	and	elimination	rules.	If	we	think	of	knowledge	of	sense	
as	proposed	above,	the	difference	between	‘exists’	and	‘self-identical’	
immediately	becomes	clear.	Read	(2004)	gives	harmonious	rules	for	
the	identity	predicate:
= Introduction
Fa		
.
.
Fb	 	
a	=	b	(Given	that	 ‘F’	occurs	as	a	predicate	variable	only	
in	‘Fa’)
= Elimination
a	=	b,	Fa
Fb
The	difference	between	the	introduction	and	elimination	rules	for	‘=’	
and	‘E’	is	obvious.	In	order	to	introduce	and	eliminate	‘=’	and	the	de-
rived	‘x	=	x’,	one	must	be	able	to	entertain	predicative	thoughts.	On	the	
level	of	sense,	‘=’	and	‘x	=	x’	are	different	from	‘E’.
The	 Neo-Brentanian	 view	 also	 provides	 a	 response	 to	 worries	
about	the	acquisition	of	the	concept	of	existence.	Kriegel	asks:
(NB1)	 ‘exists’	 is	 a	 universal,	 non-determining	 first-order	
predicate.
(NB2)	The	introduction	and	elimination	rules	for	‘exists’	jointly	
determine	its	sense.	
(NB2)	One	grasps	 the	 sense	of	 ‘exists’	 if,	 and	only	 if,	one	has	
an	inferential	capacity	that	is	governed	by	the	introduction	
and	elimination	rules	for	‘exists’.
It	is	independently	plausible	that	the	sense	of	logical	words	like	‘not’	
or	 ‘and’	is	fixed	by	introduction	and	elimination	rules.	We	know	the	
sense	of	logical	words	if	we	know	how	they	contribute	to	the	logical	
potential	of	sentences	that	contain	them.	According	to	the	Neo-Bren-
tanian	view,	‘exists’	is	a	logical	word.	This	substantiates	the	frequently	
made	observation	that	existence	is	a	formal	or	logical	concept.48 
If	‘exists’	has	the	sense	described,	it	is	a	predicate	true	of	everything.	
It	is	therefore	unsurprising	that	an	utterance	of	‘Beans	don’t	exist’	has	
no	reading	under	which	it	says	something	true	even	if	there	are	beans	
(see	section	1).	
The	Neo-Brentanian	view	does	not	explain	the	sense	of	‘exists’	via	
the	identity-predicate.	This	prevents	the	problems	that	arose	for	the	
modified	Frege–Russell	view.	There	is	no	longer	any	need	to	implau-
sibly	credit	someone	who	believes	that	Pluto	exists	with	a	belief	that	
there	is	some	thing	that	is	the	same	as	Pluto.	
6. Resolving Perplexities over the Sense of ‘Exists’ and its Acquisition
The	main	problem	of	the	first-order	view	of	existence	was	that	it	made	
it	difficult	to	articulate	the	sense	of	‘exists’.	There	is	no	higher	kind	of	
which	it	can	be	a	species,	and	to	say	that	it	is	the	highest	kind	seems	
rather	 unhelpful.	 Evans’s	 proposal	 (see	 section	 1)	 did	 not	 face	 this	
problem,	but	did	not	distinguish	the	sense	of	 ‘exists’	 from	other	uni-
versal	first-order	predicates.
48.	 See	Evans	1982,	348.
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‘Napoleon’	to	be	shorthand	for	a	definite	description	or,	like	Meinong,	
distinguishes	between	existing	and	merely	subsisting	objects.	Accord-
ing	to	Russell’s	solution,	 ‘Napoleon’	 is	not	used	to	refer	to	a	person;	
according	to	Meinong’s	solution,	 ‘Napoleon’	could	either	refer	 to	an	
existing	or	a	subsisting	object,	such	that	asserting	that	Napoleon	ex-
ists	would	have	a	conversational	point.	I	will	take	for	granted	here	that	
neither	proposal	is	plausible:	Russell’s	view	of	ordinary	proper	names	
is	 open	 to	 serious	objections,	 and	while	 there	may	be	 independent	
reasons	 to	 introduce	non-existents,	 the	communicative	point	of	 ‘Na-
poleon	exists’	is	misdescribed	by	saying	that	it	qualifies	Napoleon	as	
existent.	For	example,	after	reading	Richard	Whately’s	Historic Doubts 
Relative to Napoleon Buonaparte	(Philadelphia	1819),	Whately’s	contem-
poraries	might	end	up	in	serious	doubt	regarding	whether	Napoleon	
exists	and	need	reassurance	in	the	form	of	an	assertion	by	a	reliable	
person.49	When	they	doubt	that	Napoleon	exists,	they	don’t	entertain	
the	possibility	 that	he	might	merely	 subsist.	They	entertain	 the	pos-
sibility	that	there	is	no	such	person	as	Napoleon.
If	one	rejects	Russell’s	and	Meinong’s	assumptions,	the	first-order	
construal	of	‘exist’	seems	to	make	utterances	of	‘Napoleon	exists’	con-
versationally	 pointless	 and	 utterances	 of	 ‘Napoleon	 does	 not	 exist’	
manifestly	 false.50	But	many	assertions	of	existence	have	a	conversa-
tional	point,	and	negative	existential	statements	are	often	true.51	How	
can	a	first-order	 theorist	 account	 for	 this?	Evans	 (1982,	 362)	 argued	
that	an	utterance	of	a	negative	existential	involves	a	hidden	operator	
that	marks	 the	move	 from	pretending	 to	 refer	 to	 ‘serious’	 reference	
and	predication.	But	while	one	may	add	‘really’	for	emphasis,	it	is	im-
plausible	that	in	‘Napoleon	exists’	or	‘Napoleon	does	not	exist’,	‘Napo-
leon’	is	used	in	a	special	mode.52 
49.	 Kripke	2013,	8,	uses	this	example	for	a	different	purpose.
50.	See	 Donnellan	 1974,	 7,	 about	 this	 problem	 for	 the	 assertion	 of	 negative	
existentials.
51.	 See	Mackie	1976,	245;	Sainsbury	2005,	90.
52.	 See	Sainsbury	1999,	176,	who	responds	to	Wiggins	1995	on	the	“speculative	
mode”.	
[O]ne	immediate	worry	is	that	it	is	unclear	on	this	view	
how	we	might	acquire the concept	of	existence.	The	most	
basic	way	to	acquire	the	concept	of	F	is	by	interacting	suf-
ficiently	with	Fs	and	non-Fs	to	develop	a	sensitivity	to	the	
difference	between	them.	But	if	existence	were	a	formal	
property	 of	 everything,	 this	 kind	 of	 differential	 interac-
tion	with	existents	and	nonexistents	would	be	ruled	out.	
(Kriegel	2015,	84)
The	 concept	 of	 existence,	Kriegel	 continues,	 cannot	 be	 acquired	 by	
coming	to	know	an	analysis.	For	being	cannot	be	defined	as	a	species	
of	a	more	general	kind.	Saying	that	it	is	an	innate	concept	just	pushes	
the	problem	back.	What	 is	 the	phylogenetic	mechanism	of	 concept	
acquisition?	So	the	universal	concept	of	existence	cannot	be	acquired.
The	 acquisition	worry	 arises	 only	 if	we	 assume	 that	 acquiring	 a	
concept	requires	us	to	be	able	to	distinguish	between	those	things	that	
fall	under	the	concept	and	those	that	don’t.	If	this	were	right,	no	con-
cept	like	identity	could	be	acquired.	The	Neo-Brentanian	view	yields	
an	immediate	response:	one	acquires	some	concepts	by	acquiring	the	
disposition	to	make	certain	inferential	moves	or	to	find	these	inferen-
tial	moves	primitively	compelling.
7. The Conversational Point of Singular Existence Statements
According	to	Frege’s	argument,	discussed	in	section	1,	the	predication	
of	universal	properties	is	conversationally	pointless.	Let	us	briefly	re-
hearse	the	main	points	here.	When	a	speaker	utters,	for	example,	the	
sentence	 ‘Napoleon	 is	 short’,	 she	 refers	 to	Napoleon	and	says	some-
thing	about	him	 that	may	or	may	not	be	 the	 case	 independently	of	
her	act	of	 reference.	However,	 if	 ‘exists’	were	a	first-order	predicate	
like	‘is	short’,	merely	referring	to	Napoleon	in	‘Napoleon	exists’	would	
guarantee	that	‘exists’	is	true	of	Napoleon.	Hence,	predicating	‘exists’	
would	be	redundant	and	could	never	impart	new	information.	
This	 conclusion	 can	 be	 avoided	 if	 one	 either,	 like	 Russell,	 takes	
	 mark	textor Towards a Neo-Brentanian Theory of Existence
philosophers’	imprint	 –		17		– vol.	17,	no.	6	(february	2017)
Napoleon	to	exist,	the	audience	must	be	able	to judge	that	one	ought	
to	believe	 in	Napoleon	without	already	believing	 that	Napoleon	ex-
ists.	This	is	possible	if	belief-in	is	a	relation	between	a	thinker	and	a	
mode	of	presentation	that	may	or	may	not	present	an	object.	Belief-in	
Napoleon	 can	be	 such	 an	 attitude	 even	while	 the	 semantic	 content	
of	 ‘Napoleon’	is	exhausted	by	its	referent,	if	there	is	one.	For,	as	Mil-
lians	propose	 (see	section	2),	 ‘Napoleon’	may	be	directly	 referential,	
but	its	use	in	conversation	suggests	particular	modes	of	presentation.	
So,	by	saying	‘Napoleon	exists’,	a	speaker	can	communicate	that	one	
ought	to	believe	in	Napoleon	where	the	content	of	the	belief-in	is	fully	
specified	by	the	sense	of	a	singular	term.	The	relevant	content	can	vary	
from	speaker	to	speaker.	
However,	 while	 Brentano’s	 account	 of	 the	 communicative	 point	
of	existence	statements	 is	compatible	with	the	direct-reference	view,	
combining	the	two	will	lead	to	unwanted	results.	According	to	the	di-
rect	reference	view,	an	utterance	of	‘Vulcan	does	not	exist’	literally	says	
nothing,	because	it	does	not	express	a	proposition.	
Now	 descriptive	 views	 of	 proper	 names	 that	 take	 the	 semantic	
content	of	a	proper	name	to	be	the	sense	of	a	definite	description	are	
implausible	 for	well-known	 reasons.	 But	 one	 can	 reject	 such	 views	
without	eo ipso	 accepting	 the	direct	 reference	view	 that	 leads	 to	 the	
problem	above.	For	example,	Sainsbury	(2005,	73f)	takes	the	sense	of	
a	proper	name	‘N’	to	be	given	by	an	axiom	of	an	interpretative	theory	
of	truth:
(∀x) (‘N’ refers to x if, and only if, x = N)
The	theory	does	not	aim	to	specify	the	sense	of	a	proper	name,	wheth-
er	empty	or	not,	 in	descriptive	terms.	Since	the	background	logic	of	
the	theory	is	a	free	negative	logic,	the	axiom	is	true	even	if	‘N’	is	empty.	
This	theory	allows	‘Vulcan	does	not	exist’	to	say	something	that	is	liter-
ally	true.	Brentano’s	view	can	then	be	used	to	explain	the	communica-
tive	point	of	these	utterances.54
54.	 Sainsbury	(2005,	201–2)	is	sympathetic	to	the	second-order	view	of	existence	
and	 suggests	 an	utterance	 of	 ‘N	 exists’	 to	 express	 a	 statement	 that	 can	be	
Brentano	has	an	answer	 to	 this	 conundrum	 that	posits	neither	a	
hidden	operator	nor	different	modes	of	speaking.	 It	 is	based	on	 the	
thesis	that	‘exists’	is	not	a	real	predicate	(see	section	4).	Again	we	can	
expound	this	idea	by	relying	on	our	intuitive	understanding	of	‘good’.	
Katkov,	a	second-generation	Brentanian,	stresses	that	the	judgement	
that	A	is	good	is	not	about A:
If	we	take	the	standpoint	that	‘good’	is	not	a	real	predicate,	
we	immediately	realise	that	this	judgement	is	not	about	A, 
but	about	an	emotional	activity	[Gemütstätigkeit]	directed	
on	A.	(Katkov	1937,	18;	my	translation)
The	 judgement	 concerns,	 in	 the	primary	 sense,	 an	 attitude	directed	
on	A;	it	is	not	about	A.	Similarly,	uttering	‘A	exists’	is	not	an	assertion	
about	A	to	the	effect	that	it	is	such-and-such,	but	about	believing	in	A 
to	the	effect	that	one	ought	to	believe	in	A.53	When	one	asserts	that	
Napoleon	exists,	one	does	not	expect	and	intend	one’s	audience	to	ar-
rive	at	a	judgement	about	Napoleon	to	the	effect	that	he	has	a	property	
like	being	short,	but	comes	to	judge	that	one ought to have the attitude 
of belief-in Napoleon.	 The	 speaker	primarily	 intends	 and	expects	 that	
her	audience	will	come	to	the	view	that	one	ought	to	have	an	attitude	
whose	content	can	be	specified	by	using	‘Napoleon’.	The	audience	is	
supposed	to	judge	that	believing	in	Napoleon	is	what	one	ought	to	do.	
The	concept	 that	figures	 in	 the	 judgement	 is	a	normative	first-order	
concept.	If	the	audience	comes	to	have	this	attitude	and	are	rational	
believers,	they	will	come	to	believe	in	Napoleon.	This	is	a	further	effect	
intended	by	the	speaker.	But	since	this	further	effect	can	be	achieved	
without	already	taking	‘Napoleon’	to	refer,	Brentano’s	account	allows	
assertions	of	‘Napoleon’	to	have	a	point.
Is	Brentano’s	account	of	the	communicative	role	of	existence	state-
ments	 compatible	with	 the	view	 that	 ‘Napoleon’	 is	not	 an	abbrevia-
tion	for	a	definite	description?	For	if	 the	speaker’s	primary	intention	
is	 achievable	without	presupposing	 that	 the	 audience	 already	 takes	
53.	 See	Brentano	1973,	90	[144];	see	also	Brentano	1880ff,	90.
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On	 the	Neo-Brentanian	 view,	 the	 normative	 import	 of	 ‘exists’	 is	
captured	by	the	elimination	rules	for	this	expression.	If	one	is	disposed	
to	assert	 ‘A	exists’,	one	ought	 to	believe	 in	A	on	pain	of	 irrationality.	
Hence,	the	Neo-Brentanian	can	help	herself	to	Brentano’s	response	to	
the	communicative	conundrum.	Someone	who	asserts	that	Napoleon	
exists	does	not	want	to	predicate	a	property	of	Napoleon,	but	intends	
his	audience	to	arrive	at	belief-in	Napoleon	by	applying	the	elimina-
tion	rule	for	‘exists’.
To	conclude:	Brentano’s	view	of	the	concept	of	existence	is	flawed.	But	
it	 contains	 an	 insight	 that	 can	 be	 developed	 into	 the	Neo-Brentani-
an	view.	This	view	is	defensible	and	constitutes	an	alternative	to	the	
Frege–Russell	view.55 
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